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Like a Good Neighbor 
A STATE FARM SOLUTION TO THE FCC’S NET 
NEUTRALITY LIMBO 
INTRODUCTION 
[It is] competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the 
new source of supply, the new type of organization—competition which 
commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at 
the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at 
their foundations and their very lives.  
Joseph Schumpeter1 
In 1942, economist Joseph Schumpeter described 
innovation as a process of “creative destruction” in which 
entrepreneurial competition spurred the “destruction” of old 
ideas, products, businesses, or industries and replaced them 
with new ones.2 At its core, Schumpeter’s theory aptly describes 
the state of the communications industry, spread across 
various forms of media and industries, where large incumbent 
firms compete against many smaller firms or individual 
entrepreneurs. For every Comcast-NBC conglomerate, for 
example, there exists an upstart company like Netflix standing 
ready to challenge the industry’s status quo. From 
Schumpeter’s standpoint, entrepreneurial competition drives 
the incumbents to innovate and create new products out of fear 
of displacement by the entrepreneurs.3 Product innovation in 
turn drives economic growth.  
  
 1 JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 83 (1950). 
Innovation is “industrial mutation” that “incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure 
from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one.” Id.  
 2 Id. 
 3 The entrepreneurs, on the other hand, attempt to create new products or 
new ideas as a way to usurp the market position held by the incumbents. While 
Schumpeter’s growth theory accommodates the existence of firms that exhibit 
monopolistic behavior—such as manipulating price, quality, or quantity of a 
commodity—it does not necessarily account for a market structure in which 
incumbents control more than just a commodity or factor of production, that is, by 
controlling the platform of competition itself. 
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As a result of consolidation in the communications 
industry, the large incumbent companies have grown even 
larger, and as a consequence, a smaller number of firms offer 
an increasing variety of services. Phone and cable companies 
no longer offer simple television programming and phone 
services over copper, coaxial, or fiber optic cable; those wires 
also serve as the gateway to the Internet. With industry 
consolidation, phone and cable companies now serve as the 
primary Internet service providers (ISPs) in the United States, 
placing them in control of the physical wires attached to users’ 
homes as well as the broader networks that connect their 
subscribers to the rest of the world. Broadband Internet has 
produced a plethora of new ways for users to access dynamic 
video, sound, and other communication technologies, many of 
which threaten to displace the traditional telephony and 
television products offered by phone and cable companies. 
Rather than respond to these threats by innovating or creating 
new competitive products, however, the incumbents could 
eliminate or weaken the impact of competition generated by 
new technologies because they control the platform of 
competition itself, that is, the broadband connection.  
Broadband providers face increasing incentives to 
interfere with broadband users’ access to certain kinds of 
online content, and not just with respect to products that 
compete with their own products.4 Reported or threatened 
methods of interference include outright blocking of certain 
kinds of online content,5 limiting the speed at which users can 
download certain kinds of content, giving preference to 
affiliated content or degrading upload or download speeds for 
unaffiliated content, or charging content creators for access to 
  
 4 ISPs have faced challenges to existing business models due to increased 
consumption of network resources by users accessing high bandwidth content as well 
as declining revenues in traditional telecommunications offerings like phone and cable 
services. See Rob Frieden, Network Neutrality or Bias?—Handicapping the Odds for A 
Tiered and Branded Internet, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 171, 173 (2007) (“Core 
telecommunications service revenue streams, such as that provided by basic wireline 
telephone services, have declined as increasing numbers of subscribers migrate to new 
options provided by wireless carriers, cable television companies and Voice over the 
Internet Protocol (‘VoIP’) ventures.” (footnotes omitted)). For example, revenues earned 
from traditional phone services declined from $97.6 billion in 2000 to $76.6 billion in 
2009. See INDUSTRY ANALYSIS & TECHNOLOGY DIV., WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, 
FCC, TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE 3-5 tbl.3.3 (Sept. 2010), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-301823A1.pdf. 
 5 Declan McCullagh, Telco agrees to stop blocking VoIP calls, CNET NEWS 
(Mar. 3, 2005, 4:08 PM), http://news.cnet.com/Telco-agrees-to-stop-blocking-VoIP-
calls/2100-7352_3-5598633.html. 
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the ISP’s subscribers.6 Opponents of these practices argue in 
favor of the principle of “network neutrality,” which represents 
the idea that regulators should prohibit broadband providers 
from discriminating between different types of online content. 
The most egregious occurrence of interference arose in North 
Carolina in 2005 when a broadband provider blocked an 
Internet-based phone service used by its subscribers because 
the service had cut into its revenue earned from long distance 
telephony. The FCC has thus identified a need to regulate 
these types of practices as a way to foster innovation among the 
incumbent firms as well as the insurgent entrepreneurs,7 many 
of whom depend on unrestricted access to broadband users in 
order to remain competitive. The FCC has experienced great 
difficulty, however, in justifying its jurisdiction to regulate 
these practices following legal challenges to the agency’s 
authority to regulate broadband at all.8  
In light of these legal challenges, the FCC must find a 
way to clearly delineate the boundaries of its jurisdiction before 
it may properly regulate broadband. This note offers a new 
jurisdictional path by which the FCC may properly do so. In 
the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq., 
Congress bestowed upon the FCC broad authority “to regulate 
common carrier services, including landline telephony (Title II 
of the Act); radio transmissions, including broadcast television, 
radio, and cellular telephony (Title III); and ‘cable services,’ 
including cable television (Title VI).”9 The Communications Act, 
as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, offers 
definitional distinctions between “telecommunications services” 
and “information services,” and the FCC adopted these statutory 
definitions as a means of distinguishing between technologies it 
would regulate under Title II (telecommunications services) and 
those it would not (information services).10 In 2002, the FCC 
  
 6 In re Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Indus. Practices, 25 F.C.C. 
Rcd. 17905, 17915-16 (2010) [hereinafter Open Internet Order]. 
 7 Id. at 17909-15. 
 8 Edward Wyatt, U.S. Court Curbs F.C.C. Authority on Web Traffic, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/07/technology/ 
07net.html. 
 9 Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citations 
omitted). Title II of the Act was codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-276 (2006). Title III of the 
Act was codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-399b. And Title VI of the Act was codified at 47 
U.S.C. §§ 521-573.  
 10 Information services include, inter alia, “protocol conversion, IP address 
number assignment, domain name resolution through a domain name system (DNS), 
network security, and caching, . . . traditional ISP services such as e-mail, access to online 
newsgroups, and creating or obtaining and aggregating content.” Inquiry Concerning 
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issued an opinion in Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to 
the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities (“Declaratory 
Ruling”), in which it concluded that broadband Internet 
qualified as an “information service”11 and, as a result, was 
exempted from all Title II regulation.12 Today, the FCC faces 
difficulty in justifying its authority to regulate broadband due to 
its adoption of “information” or “telecommunications” service 
categories as a proxy for determining regulability under Title 
II.13 This categorical exemption continues today, notwithstanding 
technological advances and industry practices that have rendered 
the categories functionally indistinct and outdated, and prevents 
the FCC from adequately serving the Communication Act’s goals of 
fostering an innovative and dynamic environment for the Internet.  
The FCC should abandon its decisions that produced the 
categorical exemption approach, including the 2002 Declaratory 
Ruling and a 1980 opinion, In re Second Computer Inquiry 
(Computer II).14 Instead, the FCC should adopt a more flexible 
approach that asks whether any particular technology or entity 
serves the same or equivalent function as those technologies 
traditionally regulated under Title II. Doing so would permit the 
FCC to reassert its proper Title II jurisdiction over broadband 
Internet while retaining the flexibility to adopt only those 
regulations that would serve the public interest. Such a 
reversal, however, must be adequately supported by “reasoned 
analysis” by the agency in order to withstand judicial review 
for arbitrary and capricious action under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, as set forth by the Supreme Court in Motor 
Vehicle Manufacturers Association of United States, Inc. v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.15  
To keep pace with continuously changing conditions in 
an industry marked by rapid technological innovation, the FCC 
must at times amend or abrogate its rules on policy matters to 
  
High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C. Rcd. 4798, 
4809-11, ¶¶ 17-18 (2002) [hereinafter Declaratory Ruling] (footnotes omitted). 
 11 Id. at 4802 ¶ 7. 
 12 Id. 
 13 These categories have become a “proxy for regulability” because the 
Communications Act does not necessarily mandate their use as the exclusive means of 
distinguishing between regulated or exempted technologies. The “proxy,” then, draws 
its authority from FCC rulemaking, subject only to the traditional strictures of 
administrative law for their proper implementation. See infra Part II. 
 14 Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations 
(Second Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980), aff’d sub nom. Computer & 
Commc’ns Indus. Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982) [hereinafter Computer II]. 
 15 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41-43 (1983) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006)); see infra Part II.B.  
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uphold the goals of the Communications Act. This note argues 
that the FCC should amend its policy of categorically exempting 
broadband Internet and information services from all regulation. 
Part I describes the current state of the broadband industry and 
the arguments underlying the network neutrality debate. Part II 
discusses the State Farm standard of judicial review applicable 
to a reversal of policy by a federal agency. Part III lays out the 
grounds on which the FCC could articulate the kind of “reasoned 
analysis” necessary to justify the reversal, including recognition 
of the technical and functional anomalies produced under the 
existing categorical exemption approach. Part IV concludes that 
Title II treatment would not necessarily subject broadband 
providers to the full scope of common carrier regulation because 
the forbearance provisions of section 160 would permit 
implementation of network neutrality regulations as a light-touch 
common carrier approach.  
I. THE NETWORK NEUTRALITY DEBATE 
A. Broadband 
1. The Most Loved Innovation of the Decade 
In September 2011, consumer electronics website T3 
announced the results of a survey of 2000 people who were asked 
about their “most loved innovation” of the decade. Their number 
one response was broadband Internet.16 As of October 2010, over 
68.2 percent of U.S. households enjoy access to high-speed 
broadband, up from just 4.4 percent in 2000.17 Broadband 
connectivity today serves as a key indicator of national economic 
growth and productivity.18 Broadband Internet fosters “new 
business models, new processes, new inventions, new and 
improved goods and services,” increases economic competitiveness, 
lowers information costs, improves market access to global 
  
 16 Devina Divecha, Broadband Is the Most Loved Innovation of the Decade, 
T3.COM (Sept. 8, 2011, 4:33 PM), http://www.t3.com/news/broadband-is-the-most-loved-
innovation-of-the-decade. 
 17 NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, DIGITAL 
NATION: EXPANDING INTERNET USAGE 3, 7 (Feb. 2011), available at 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia_internet_use_report_february_2011.pdf. 
The National Telecommunications & Information Administration (under the 
Commerce Department) calculated these numbers from the Census Bureau’s Current 
Population Surveys conducted as part of the 2010 Census. Id. at 6.  
 18 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD COMMUNICATIONS 
OUTLOOK 40 (2011). 
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markets, and permits workplace flexibility.19 The FCC defines 
“broadband” as “advanced telecommunications capability,” which 
means “high-speed, switched, broadband telecommunications 
capability that enables users to originate and receive high-quality 
voice, data, graphics, and video telecommunications using any 
technology.”20 Telecommunications capability includes Digital 
Subscriber Line (DSL), cable modem, fiber optic, wireless 
broadband, satellite, and broadband over power line (BPL) 
services.21 Cable modem and DSL service serve as the primary 
means of broadband access, although consumers increasingly 
have access to wireless, mobile, and fiber optic broadband.22 Cable 
companies provide broadband access to their subscribers through 
the same coaxial cables used to provide television programming.23 
Similarly, telephone companies provide broadband access through 
the phone wires that also provide phone service.24  
2. End-to-End and Best-Efforts Delivery 
The architects of the Internet constructed its networks 
based on a principle of design that envisioned the ISP in the 
role of a passive intermediary.25 The ISP had little reason to 
interact with the data traveling through its networks any more 
  
 19 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., BROADBAND AND THE ECONOMY: 
MINISTERIAL BACKGROUND REPORT 8 (2008). 
 20 47 U.S.C. § 1302(d)(1) (2006). 
 21 Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications 
Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to 
Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, as Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, FCC 11-78, at 3 n.9 (May 
20, 2011) [hereinafter Seventh Broadband Deployment Report], available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-11-78A1.pdf; Types of Broadband 
Connections, BROADBAND.GOV, http://www.broadband.gov/broadband_types.html (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2013). To qualify as broadband, the internet service must enable a user to 
download content at four megabytes per second (mbps) and to upload content at one mbps 
to qualify as a broadband connection. See Seventh Broadband Deployment Report, supra, 
at 2 n.2. 
 22 See Rob Frieden, Invoking and Avoiding the First Amendment: How 
Internet Service Providers Leverage Their Status As Both Content Creators and Neutral 
Conduits, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1279, 1323 n.36 (2010) (citing Indus. Analysis & Tech. 
Div., Wireline Competition Bureau, Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, High-Speed Services for 
Internet Access: Status as of December 31, 2008 7-8 (2010), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/ 
edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-296239A1.pdf). 
 23 Cable Modem, Types of Broadband Connections, BROADBAND.GOV, 
http://www.broadband.gov/broadband_types.html#cable (last visited May 16, 2013). 
 24 Digital Subscriber Line (DSL), Types of Broadband Connections, 
BROADBAND.GOV, http://www.broadband.gov/broadband_types.html#dsl (last visited 
May 16, 2013). 
 25 See J.H. SALTZER ET AL., M.I.T. LAB. FOR COMPUTER SCI., END-TO-END 
ARGUMENTS IN SYSTEM DESIGN 2-3 (1984), available at http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/ 
www/publications/endtoend/endtoend.pdf. 
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than was necessary to transmit it from point A to point B.26 By 
contrast, highly-sophisticated computers sitting at the ends of 
the networks would receive that data, inspect and process it, 
and put it to use before sending new data back out to the 
network destined for other computers on the “other side” of the 
Internet.27 Thousands of networks exist between those end points, 
including those owned or operated by ISPs, whose only function is 
to determine the next point in the network that would bring the 
data closer to its final destination. From this design principle 
emerged the idea of a “dumb” network with “smart” edges, such 
that the middle part of the network performed only the simplest 
functions like routing, while the computer systems at the edges 
performed the more complicated tasks necessary for a complete 
exchange of information over the Internet. 
This “end-to-end principle” allocates the most important 
tasks to the endpoints of the network in order to obtain 
maximum network efficiency.28 These efficiency considerations 
obtain greater significance upon the threat of ISPs to begin 
interfering with data they receive in the “middle” of the 
network, that is, anywhere between the origin and the 
destination computers. Any practices implemented by ISPs to 
block, limit, or reduce the quality of transmission for certain 
kinds of online content could potentially disrupt the traditional 
end-to-end principle underlying the architecture of the 
Internet, especially where ISPs implement those practices 
discriminatorily based on the substantive content of the data 
rather than transmission efficiency.  
B. Network Neutrality 
Many ISPs have engaged in or expressed an intent to 
charge for, block, limit, or otherwise restrict their subscribers’ 
access to certain kinds of online content, with each proposal 
constituting a form of interference that would violate the end-
to-end principle and network neutrality. Because these 
proposals exist in various forms and would vary in their 
  
 26 See id. 
 27 See Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet 
Architecture and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 829 (2004) (“The network 
simply forwards or routes the data packets and does not—and cannot by architecture—
discriminate or differentiate traffic generated by different applications.”). 
 28 See id. at 839-40; David P. Reed et al., Active Networking and End-to-End 
Arguments, STANFORD, http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/e2e/papers/Saltzer_Clark_Reed_ 
ActiveNetworkinge2e.html (last modified May 15, 1998, 3:17 PM). 
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application, each individual proposal involves unique 
arguments both for and against their implementation.  
As a general matter, however, proponents of network 
neutrality argue that network management practices treating 
content unequally might trigger concerns about free expression 
on the Internet,29 while others see such discriminatory practices 
as harmful to economic growth and innovation.30 There are 
natural incentives for providers to engage in discriminatory 
behavior for anticompetitive reasons, given that the online 
activities that most heavily burden their networks are also 
those that directly compete with broadband providers’ separate 
cable television and telephone service products.31 This presents an 
unacceptable risk of anticompetitive behavior that becomes more 
pronounced in a large number of geographic regions where 
consumers have access to only two or fewer broadband providers.32 
Conversely, opponents of net neutrality fear that the 
FCC’s regulatory interference in the industry would reduce 
broadband providers’ incentives to innovate or invest in 
expanding capacity and thereby cause great harm to consumers 
and the economy as a whole.33 The private sector has invested 
hundreds of billions of dollars in broadband infrastructure over 
the past decade.34 Verizon, for example, invested $80 billion in 
capital expenditures between 2004 and 2008—more than any 
other company in the United States in any industry.35 Thus, 
any regulation implemented by the FCC must be carefully 
tailored to avoid undermining such a high level of beneficial, 
  
 29 JAY STANLEY, NETWORK NEUTRALITY 101: WHY THE GOVERNMENT MUST 
ACT TO PRESERVE THE FREE AND OPEN INTERNET 21 (2010), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/netneutrality_report_20101021.pdf. 
 30 Tim Wu & Christopher S. Yoo, Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and 
Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575, 581-83 (2007). 
 31 Open Internet Order, supra note 6, at 17915-18. 
 32 According to the FCC, four percent of people in the United States have 
access to three or more broadband providers; seventy-eight percent have access to two 
broadband providers; thirteen percent have access to only one provider; and five percent 
have access to none. Broadband Competition and Innovation Policy, BROADBAND.GOV, 
http://www.broadband.gov/plan/4-broadband-competition-and-innovation- 
policy/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2013). 
 33 Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking Broadband Internet 
Access, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 41-50 (2008). 
 34 Reply Comments of Verizon and Verizon Wireless on the Seventh 
Broadband Deployment Notice of Inquiry, Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of 
Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and 
Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to 
Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended by the Broadband 
Data Improvement Act, GN Docket No. 10-159, at 1-2 (2011), available at 
https://prodnet.www.neca.org/publicationsdocs/wwpdf/10610verizon.pdf. 
 35 Id. at 2. 
2013] LIKE A GOOD NEIGHBOR 1595 
necessary investment. Some opponents of network neutrality, 
however, believe that the issue amounts to little more than a 
contract issue between broadband providers and their 
subscribers.36 From a business perspective, providers argue that 
they must be afforded discretion to efficiently manage their 
networks—even when a degradation of service for some online 
activities may result—particularly when those practices reflect 
legitimate business decisions or necessary network 
management practices.37 
II. REVERSAL OF AGENCY ACTION 
A. Specific Policies Subject to Reversal 
The FCC has identified a need to regulate broadband 
because of the threat of ISP interference with users’ broadband 
connections. The agency, however, has experienced enormous 
difficulty in demonstrating its jurisdictional authority to 
implement such regulation due to its rigid definitional 
classification system, which labels technologies as categorically 
subject to, or exempt from, its regulatory reach. To successfully 
establish a long-term, sustainable jurisdictional framework for 
regulating broadband, the FCC must first reverse certain 
agency decisions that produced the current categorical 
exemption approach. In its 1980 opinion, Computer II, the FCC 
adopted an approach to regulating Title II technologies by 
applying common carrier obligations to providers of “basic 
services,” while exempting those offering “enhanced services.”38 
“Basic service” meant “a pure transmission capability over a 
communications path that is virtually transparent in terms of 
its interaction with customer supplied information,”39 which 
excluded any data-processing functions. “Enhanced service,” by 
contrast, included the application of some additional process by 
either the subscriber or the supplier of the service before the 
user would be able to view the information.40 The “basic” and 
  
 36 Julian Sanchez, More Net Neutrality Violations That Aren’t, CATO @ 
LIBERTY (Nov. 11, 2010, 1:40 PM), http://www.cato.org/blog/more-net-neutrality-
violations-arent. 
 37 Joint Brief for Verizon and MetroPCS at 49, Verizon v. FCC, No. 11-1355 
(D.C. Cir. July 2, 2012), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/ 
DOC-317120A1.pdf. 
 38 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
976 (2005) (citing Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 417-23, ¶¶ 86-101 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). 
 39 Id. at 976 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 40 See Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d at 387. 
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“enhanced” categories served as predecessors to the 
“telecommunications” and “information” service categories 
currently used to determine whether the FCC could regulate 
communications technologies under Title II. In adopting these 
definitions and setting forth distinct regulatory obligations for 
each, the FCC relied on its rulemaking authority to establish 
the bifurcated regulatory regime that remains in place today. 
To recap, the FCC’s difficulties in regulating broadband 
result from policies set forth over the course of several agency 
decisions. First, the FCC established definitions for the “basic” 
and “enhanced” categories in Computer II. Second, the agency 
used these definitional categories to also define which 
technologies it would regulate under Title II. The agency, 
however, was not statutorily required to treat “enhanced 
services” as categorically exempt from Title II regulation. Third, 
when Congress later adapted the “basic service” and “enhanced 
service” definitions into the “telecommunications service” and 
“information service” definitions in the Communications Act, the 
FCC continued to use these statutory definitions as a means of 
determining which technologies it would regulate under Title II. 
As with “enhanced services,” the FCC also did not have to treat 
“information services” as categorically exempt from Title II 
regulation. Finally, in its 2002 Declaratory Ruling, the FCC 
concluded that broadband Internet qualified only as an 
“information service,” and thus was not subject to Title II 
regulation. With this final measure, the FCC used its 
rulemaking authority to push broadband beyond its Title II 
authority by placing it within a categorical exemption.  
To regulate broadband, then, the FCC must either 
abrogate the 2002 Declaratory Ruling by declaring that 
broadband instead qualifies as a “telecommunications service,” 
its Computer II decision by abandoning Computer II’s 
categorical exemption approach, or, by reversing both. 
Reversing only Computer II would maintain broadband as 
exclusively an “information service” while allowing the FCC to 
regulate broadband under Title II by abandoning the 
categorical exemption approach.  
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B. Standard of Review 
A reversal of agency policy must be analyzed under 
State Farm,41 which sets out the standard for judicial review of 
agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).42 
The APA permits courts to set aside “arbitrary” or “capricious” 
agency action.43 In determining whether an agency has engaged 
in arbitrary or capricious action, a court must determine 
whether the agency “examine[d] the relevant data and 
articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action.”44 Courts 
must uphold agency action even if the decision provides “less 
than ideal clarity” so long as “the agency’s path may reasonably 
be discerned.”45 The courts generally apply the same level of 
review to a reversal of agency policy as they apply to an agency 
decision to adopt a rule in the first place.46  
Thus, under State Farm, an agency reversing policy 
through rescission of a rule must provide a “reasoned analysis” 
to demonstrate the absence of arbitrary or capricious action.47 
In 2009 and 2012, the Supreme Court issued two opinions 
under F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (Fox I and Fox II 
respectively), in which the Court sought to clarify the State 
Farm standard for agency policy reversals.48 In Fox I, Justice 
Scalia authored a 5-4 majority opinion in which he attempted 
to clarify the standard by requiring, first, that the agency 
display awareness that the action in fact constituted a change 
of position.49 In other words, the agency may not depart from 
prior rules without actually acknowledging the fact of the 
reversal, nor can it simply ignore existing rules.50 Second, the 
agency must demonstrate the existence of good reasons for the 
new policy,51 although the agency need not prove the relative 
  
 41 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 27, 43 (1983). 
 42 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2006). 
 43 Id. § 706(2)(A). 
 44 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009) [hereinafter 
Fox I] (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43). 
 45 Id. at 513-14 (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight 
Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)). 
 46 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 41. 
 47 Fox I, 556 U.S. at 513-16 (citing State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42).  
 48 Id. at 514-16; FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2315-
16 (2012) [hereinafter Fox II].  
 49 Fox I, 556 U.S. at 514-16.  
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
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superiority of the new reasons over the old.52 A court, however, 
may require a more detailed explanation where the agency 
relies on factual findings that contradict the reasons 
supporting the original policy.53  
Following Fox I, some ambiguity remained because 
Justice Kennedy, although having joined the majority, penned 
a separate concurrence in which he offered a number of 
additional factors—in addition to those listed by Scalia—that 
he believed should also be considered. These factors, when 
compared to the considerations identified State Farm, would 
arguably create a heightened scrutiny for agency reversals of 
policy. Kennedy’s factors take on exceptional importance 
because the four-justice dissent also supported the adoption of 
this proposed level of heightened scrutiny. The dissent 
disagreed, however, with Kennedy’s conclusion that the agency 
satisfied the burden in this case.  
In particular, Kennedy believed that an agency must 
also provide an explanation for the reversal from prior policy.54 
Under that analysis, “the agency must explain why it now 
rejects the considerations that led it to adopt that initial 
policy.”55 Justifications for reversal are adequate if based on 
discoveries in science, advances in technology, or circumstances 
changed by “any of the other forces at work in a dynamic 
society.”56 Additionally, new circumstances might justify a 
reversal even where the agency must make difficult predictive 
judgments like those required in adopting a policy in the first 
place.57 Therefore, an agency would be required to first provide 
a reasoned analysis for the new policy while acknowledging the 
  
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 515. 
 54 Justice Scalia authored the 5-4 majority opinion, in which Justice Roberts, 
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined, holding that the FCC had articulated a sufficiently 
reasoned analysis for its change in policy that the agency action did not constitute 
arbitrary and capricious action. Id. at 516. Justice Kennedy, however, did not join the 
portion of the majority’s opinion expressing disapproval of the dissent’s analytical 
framework. Instead, Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence in which he joined the 
four-justice dissent to the extent that they would require an agency to explain why they 
changed the policy. Id. at 535 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). Presumably, Scalia’s opinion would require a less-searching review of the 
agency’s justification and would grant the agency action deference merely upon 
demonstration of some reasoned analysis combined with acknowledgement of the 
change itself. 
 55 Id. at 535 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 535-36. 
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departure itself, but it would then have to explain how changed 
circumstances justify the reversal.  
The question of what standard to apply is complicated 
somewhat by Fox II, in which Justice Kennedy wrote for the 
majority and merely applied the factors articulated by Justice 
Scalia’s majority in Fox I, completely ignoring the additional 
factors that he and the four-justice dissent had previously 
supported.58 Whether Justice Kennedy experienced a change of 
heart, or merely believed that the Fox I majority’s factors 
appropriately covered the agency action under the circumstances 
existing in Fox II, a careful review under a heightened analysis 
will nonetheless prove useful as a guide for agencies 
contemplating reversals of policy.  
The Fox cases not only clarify the State Farm standard 
of arbitrary and capricious review, but they also offer 
compelling factual similarities to those found in the network 
neutrality debate. The underlying facts involved the FCC’s 
reversal of its method of enforcing the prohibition of indecent 
language used on broadcast television.59 Under the initial 
policy, the FCC could penalize broadcasters for broadcasting 
indecent language as a general matter, but it provided a safe-
harbor for non-repetitive or isolated uses of an indecent word.60 
The original policy also distinguished between literal and 
nonliteral uses of offensive words, holding nonliteral uses 
actionable only if repeated.61 The FCC later reversed that policy 
by abolishing the safe harbor,62 disavowing the literal/nonliteral 
distinction,63 and adopting a context-based approach for 
  
 58 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2315-16 (2012). 
 59 Section 1464 of Title 18 prohibits any utterance of “any obscene, indecent, 
or profane language by means of radio communication.” Id. at 2312. 
 60 Fox I, 556 U.S. at 511-13. 
 61 Id. For example, use of the “F-word” without reference to the sexual act to 
which it commonly relates constitutes a nonliteral—or “expletive”—use of the word. See 
In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002 
& March 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C. Rcd. 13299, 13308 (2006) [hereinafter Broadcast Television 
Complaints Order], available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/ 
FCC-06-17A1.pdf. 
 62 In abolishing the safe harbor, the FCC believed that even a single use of an 
offensive word could “constitute [a] harmful ‘first blow[] ’ to children” and could 
encourage the widespread use of offensive words on broadcast television used only one 
at a time. Fox I, 556 U.S. at 518-19 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 63 The FCC argued that it could no longer justify the distinction between 
literal and nonliteral uses of offensive words because, with regard to the “F-word,” the 
nonliteral, expletive use of the word still derived its impact from its underlying sexual 
connotation. See Broadcast Television Complaints Order, 21 F.C.C. Rcd. at 13308. 
Thus, a “strict dichotomy between ‘expletives’ and ‘descriptions or depictions of sexual 
or excretory functions’ [was] artificial” and no longer made sense. Id. Additionally, the 
FCC stated that, in some cases, “it [would be] difficult (if not impossible) to distinguish 
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determining the actionability of an indecent broadcast.64 
Writing for a five-justice majority that included Justice 
Kennedy, Justice Scalia rejected the argument that the reversal 
constituted arbitrary or capricious action by noting that the FCC 
had explicitly acknowledged the reversal and arguing that the 
agency had articulated an “entirely rational” and “reasonable” 
explanation for abandoning the policy.65 In his separate 
concurrence, Justice Kennedy agreed that the reversal did not 
constitute arbitrary and capricious action, even under the 
dissent’s heightened scrutiny, because the agency had 
considered permissible factors and provided careful and 
complete analysis, including a procedural history of its newly-
adopted policy and the reasons for the new rule.66  
The literal/nonliteral categories at issue in the Fox cases 
greatly resemble the “telecommunications” and “information” 
service categories relevant to FCC regulation of broadband 
Internet. Justice Kennedy upheld the FCC’s disavowal of the 
literal/nonliteral categories of offensive language upon claims 
that the agency experienced great difficulty in distinguishing 
between the two.67 Similarly, the FCC sufficiently justified its 
reversal upon its recognition that the categorical “safe harbor” 
exemption for nonliteral, non-repetitive offensive words did not 
appreciate the actual harm caused by offensive words even 
when used in isolation. The FCC reasoned that harm 
nonetheless resulted because the offensive impact of nonliteral 
uses actually derived from its underlying literal connotation. In 
sum, the FCC adopted a context-based approach that 
appropriately permitted consideration of the actual harmful 
elements underlying each use of offensive language. Similar 
considerations arise with respect to FCC policies on broadband. 
Part III of this note demonstrates that many of the same 
factors would support an FCC decision to abandon use of the 
“telecommunications” and “information” service dichotomy as the 
  
whether a word is being used as an expletive or as a literal description of sexual or 
excretory functions.” Id. 
 64 Fox I, 556 U.S. at 511-13. 
 65 Id. at 516-18; cf. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of United States, Inc. v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46, 54-55 (1983) (holding that National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration reversal of seatbelt policy due to the policy’s 
potential ineffectiveness constituted arbitrary and capricious action because the agency 
failed to consider certain safety benefits resulting from that policy or whether the 
policy could be modified). 
 66 Fox I, 556 U.S. at 538 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
 67 Broadcast Television Complaints Order, supra note 61, at 13308. 
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exclusive means of determining the regulability of any particular 
communications technology. The Fox cases and State Farm, when 
read together and in review of the relevant FCC considerations, 
would obligate judicial deference for the FCC’s decision to apply 
limited Title II regulations to broadband Internet.  
III. A REASONED ANALYSIS 
A. Anticipating Reversal 
A year after deciding Computer II, the FCC issued a 
notice inquiry, In the Matter of Policy & Rules Concerning 
Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services & Facilities 
Authorizations Therefore (Competitive Carrier Notice), in 
which it acknowledged the impact of its Computer II approach 
by expressly stating:  
We wish to make clear at the outset . . . that a decision to remove 
entities from Title II regulation—under either a forbearance or 
definitional approach—does not remove our Title I and Title III 
jurisdiction over such entities, nor does it foreclose our ability to 
reimpose Title II regulation upon a principled finding that such 
action would be warranted under the Act.68 
In making these statements, the FCC reserved for itself 
the flexibility to abandon the categorical exemption approach 
that ultimately resulted in precluding “information services” 
from all FCC regulation. By its own admission, the FCC also 
understood that a definitional approach serves the same function 
as a forbearance approach69 while also acknowledging the unique 
potential of a definitional approach to create far-reaching impact.70 
Despite demonstrating candid awareness of the impact of its 
decision, the FCC nevertheless adopted inflexible rules whose 
legacies live on in the categorical exemptions applicable under 
Title II today.  
B. Legal Framework Underlying FCC Authority 
The Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq., as 
amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, grants the 
  
 68 In re Policy & Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier 
Services & Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, 448 (1981) [hereinafter 
Competitive Carrier Notice]. 
 69 Id. at 464. 
 70 Id. at 448 (“We appreciate that this fundamental review of our Title II 
regulatory responsibilities may well engender far reaching consequences.”). 
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FCC broad authority “to regulate common carrier services, 
including landline telephony; radio transmissions, including 
broadcast television, radio, and cellular telephony; and ‘cable 
services,’ including cable television.”71 The Act contains 
mandatory regulation of common carriers under Title II, which 
subjects qualifying entities to, among other things, various 
antidiscrimination and disclosure regulations. The FCC also 
maintains authority to regulate under its “ancillary jurisdiction,” 
which permits the agency to undertake regulatory action when 
“reasonably ancillary to the . . . effective performance of its 
statutorily mandated responsibilities.”72 The FCC’s ancillary 
jurisdiction applies where the agency cannot claim express 
statutory authority but believes that regulation is necessary to 
honor statements of policy expressed under the Act—but only 
when in support of a statutorily mandated responsibility.73 The 
D.C. Circuit in 2005 explicitly denied the FCC’s asserted basis 
to regulate broadband Internet under its ancillary jurisdiction 
in Comcast Corp. v. FCC.74 In 2010, the FCC again asserted 
authority to regulate broadband under its Title I ancillary 
jurisdiction based on other grounds when the agency issued its 
2010 Open Internet Order.75 Many expect that the D.C. Circuit 
will strike down those rules on jurisdictional grounds.76  
Because Title I likely cannot support regulation of 
broadband, the FCC must find a way to regulate under Title II 
if it intends to do so at all. The question of whether Title II 
applies to any particular technology depends on whether the 
technology qualifies as a “telecommunications service” or an 
“information service.”77 The FCC draws a line between 
“telecommunications services” and “information services” for 
  
 71 Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citations 
omitted); see also Edward J. Sholinsky, Blocking Access to the Information 
Superhighway: Regulating the Internet Out of the Reach of Low-Income Americans, 38 
RUTGERS L.J. 321, 357-58 (2006). 
 72 Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 644 (citing Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 
689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). 
 73 Id. The Comcast court made clear that statements of policy do not alone 
create a “statutorily mandated responsibilit[y].” Id. 
 74 Id. at 645. 
 75 Open Internet Order, supra note 6, at 18057-58 (2010) (statements of FCC 
Commissioner Robert McDowell in dissent describing the majority’s asserted basis of 
jurisdiction), appeal dismissed sub nom. Verizon v. FCC, Nos. 11-1014, 11-1016, 2011 
WL 1235523 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 4, 2011). 
 76 See, e.g., Jasmin Melvin, U.S. FCC Draws Tough Court for Web Rule 
Lawsuits, REUTERS (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/06/usa-
internet-rules-idUSN1E7951UO20111006. 
 77 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967, 977-78 (2005). 
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purposes of determining which entities to regulate as common 
carriers.78 Entities that offer telecommunications service must 
comply with the Title II common carrier requirements, whereas 
providers of information services enjoy an exemption from all such 
regulations. These distinctions result in regulation applied to 
phone service while leaving broadband Internet untouched.79  
The strict telecommunications and information service 
dichotomy attempts to draw a clear line where none actually 
exists. Because modern communications technologies increasingly 
reach across the FCC line of demarcation, the dual categories 
drawn by the statute provide little value as definitive boundaries 
for determining which technologies to regulate or exempt. The 
FCC could avoid these anomalies by abandoning its use of 
categorical exemptions, provided that the reversal of policy 
could withstand State Farm review. To satisfy the State Farm 
standard, as clarified by the Fox cases, the FCC could 
demonstrate a reasoned analysis for the change in policy by 
reviewing its prior factual findings that telecommunications 
service in fact comprises a critical component of information 
service. To comply with Justice Kennedy’s heightened scrutiny in 
Fox I, the FCC could justify its rejection of the considerations 
underlying its prior approach by demonstrating how technological 
convergence has rendered these categories functionally indistinct. 
Specifically, advances in technology have permitted broadband 
users to receive telecommunications and cable service by means 
of information service platforms. Lastly, the FCC’s inflexible 
rules conflict with common law definitions of “common carrier,” 
the application of which would otherwise permit regulation of 
broadband providers under Title II.  
C. Technical Distinctions 
The FCC’s difficulty in drawing coherent boundaries 
between basic and enhanced service—and later, between 
telecommunications and information service—reflects an 
outdated formalist approach to applying different regulatory 
obligations to different technologies that fit neatly into one 
category or another.80 The FCC’s 2002 Declaratory Ruling 
  
 78 Declaratory Ruling, supra note 10, at 5, ¶ 7; see also Computer II, 77 
F.C.C.2d 384 (1980), aff’d sub nom. Computer & Commc’ns Indus. Ass’n v. FCC, 693 
F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 79 See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 974-77. 
 80 See Christopher S. Yoo, New Models of Regulation and Interagency 
Governance, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REV. 701, 714 (2003). 
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continued that approach by categorically exempting broadband 
from all regulation.81  
A question arises as to whether the FCC might 
permissibly reverse its earlier interpretation of the 
Communications Act in classifying broadband as an information 
service under the Declaratory Ruling in light of the fact that the 
Supreme Court later affirmed that particular interpretation in 
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X 
Internet Services.82 In Brand X, the Court deferred to the FCC’s 
interpretation of the Communications Act under the Chevron 
standard of judicial review.83 Chevron holds that “where 
Congress [leaves] . . . a gap [in the enabling statute] for the 
agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the 
agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by 
regulation.”84 To review an agency action, a court must then ask 
whether the agency’s interpretation amounts to a permissible 
reading of the statute.85 Importantly, however, the Court noted 
that approval of an agency interpretation under Chevron does 
not amount to a determination that the particular construction 
was the only construction possible.86 Nor does judicial approval 
require a construction that the court would have reached if the 
matter had originally arisen in a judicial proceeding.87 Thus, 
multiple constructions may satisfy the statutory purpose, and a 
court’s determination that one of them is permissible does not 
foreclose other interpretations. Although the Supreme Court 
approved the FCC’s Declaratory Ruling classifying broadband 
providers as exclusively an information service, this does not 
preclude a different interpretation that the broadband providers 
do in fact offer telecommunications services.88 This suggests that 
  
 81 Declaratory Ruling, supra note 10, at 4819. 
 82 545 U.S. 967. 
 83 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842-43 (1984). 
 84 Id. at 843-44. 
 85 Id. at 843. 
 86 Id. at 843 n.11. 
 87 Id. 
 88 In fact, the Supreme Court in Brand X stated explicitly that a prior 
Chevron interpretation by the FCC does not foreclose reversal of that interpretation in 
the future. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
981 (2005) (relying on Chevron, 467 U.S. 837). Brand X argued that Chevron deference 
did not apply to the FCC’s Declaratory Ruling because of the action’s inconsistency 
with the FCC’s past treatment of broadband providers as common carriers. See, e.g., 
Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980), aff’d sub nom. Computer & Commc’ns Indus. 
Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982). “An initial agency interpretation is not 
instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the agency . . . must consider varying 
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the FCC’s classification of broadband remains open to the 
agency’s own reversal if justified under State Farm analysis.  
The Supreme Court’s analysis in Brand X helps to 
identify the technical anomalies produced by the FCC’s 
categorical exemption approach. Specifically, the Court’s 
analysis—and Justice Scalia’s dissent in particular—
demonstrates that information services do in fact contain a 
telecommunications component, relevant to a State Farm 
review requiring factual support for reversing a prior policy. 
Recognition of this fact would adequately demonstrate a 
reasoned analysis by the agency in adopting a new policy. 
Brand X would certainly prove informative if the FCC were to 
reverse its Declaratory Ruling.  
The FCC’s classification of broadband as an information 
service in the Declaratory Ruling depended on the technical 
manner in which users receive information through the 
service.89 Specifically, the FCC treated as conclusive the fact 
that broadband providers do not “offer” a telecommunications 
component of information service as a stand-alone product that 
customers could separately purchase.90 Companies that offer 
phone services, on the other hand, “offer” telecommunications 
directly to consumers as a separate, independent product—
namely, the transmission of voice communication itself.91 The 
existence of a processing capability as the primary sellable 
product therefore permitted the FCC to distinguish information 
services from telecommunications services even though the 
telecommunications service comprises a critical part of 
information services.  
Writing in dissent, Justice Scalia concluded that the 
FCC’s determination that broadband providers do not offer 
telecommunications to the public relied on an implausible 
reading of the Communications Act.92 He argued that the 
telecommunications component of information services does not 
lose its independent quality merely because the broadband 
provider does not sell it as a finished product to the end user.93 
  
interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.” Brand X, 545 U.S. 
at 981 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-64). 
 89 See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 976. 
 90 Id. at 989. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 1005 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 93 Id. at 1008. “[F]or the inputs of a finished service to qualify as the objects 
of an ‘offer’ (as that term is reasonably understood), it is perhaps a sufficient, but surely 
not a necessary, condition that the seller offer separately ‘each discrete input that is 
necessary to providing . . . a finished service.’” Id. at 1007-08. 
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Scalia noted that any reasonable consumer would understand 
that broadband includes “high speed access to the internet” 
(the telecommunications component) in addition to “other 
applications and functions” (the data processing functions).94  
In applying the State Farm/Fox analysis, the FCC must 
first recognize the fact of reversal in order to survive judicial 
review.95 Second, the FCC should engage in a reasoned analysis to 
demonstrate good reasons for a reversal of the policy. Because the 
agency has already undertaken an investigation to establish the 
factual existence of a telecommunications component in 
broadband,96 the FCC must merely demonstrate a reasoned 
analysis for adopting an alternative interpretation of “offer” 
under the Communications Act. To ensure that the FCC would 
also satisfy the additional requirements articulated by Justice 
Kennedy in his Fox I concurrence, the FCC would find 
adequate support by discussing the technical means by which 
broadband service operates, as discussed below.97  
When broadband providers offer Internet access to the 
public, they serve their users in primarily two functions. The 
first is when the broadband users initiate communication with 
other computers. The ISP sends out information to computers 
in the broader Internet and requests information in return. In 
this capacity, they perform, among other things, data-
processing functions such as DNS resolution or retrieval from 
caches storing popular content, consistent with the definition of 
“information services.”98 ISPs perform their second function 
when transmitting information received from other computers 
to their subscribers. In this regard, broadband providers 
  
 94 Id. at 1008. Justice Scalia provided a memorable analogy about pizza 
delivery service to illustrate the implausibility of the FCC and the majority’s 
interpretation of “offer.” Id. at 1007. A pizza restaurant does not sell delivery service 
separate from the pizza product itself, but any reasonable consumer would understand 
that the restaurant “offers” delivery service with its sales of pizza. Id. The FCC’s 
reading would require a statement from a pizza restaurant akin to: “No, we do not offer 
delivery—but if you order a pizza from us, we’ll bake it for you and then bring it to your 
house.” Id.  
 95 See Fox I, 556 U.S. 502, 515-16 (2009). 
 96 The FCC’s factual investigation undertaken prior to the 2002 Declaratory 
Ruling resulted in a conclusion that telecommunications did in fact comprise a portion 
of information services. As such, because the FCC has itself treated 
telecommunications service as a critical component of information services, no fact-
based conflict would subject the decision to heightened scrutiny. See Brand X, 545 U.S. 
at 992-93. 
 97 Fox I, 556 U.S. at 533-35. 
 98 These functions “include protocol conversion, IP address number 
assignment, domain name resolution through a domain name system (DNS), network 
security, and caching.” Declaratory Ruling, supra note 10, at 12-13, ¶¶ 17-18. 
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primarily serve as conduits of information without altering the 
form of the communication before receipt by the users.99 Once 
the data leaves the user, ISPs and network service providers 
function much like postal workers, who only need to read the 
destination address on the exterior of a letter to figure out 
where it should go.100 For postal workers—and for ISPs 
performing their routing functions—opening the package to 
look at the contents would be completely unnecessary when the 
destination address appears on its exterior. Additionally, the 
fact that fewer ISPs now engage in the full scope of data-
processing functions demonstrates both the existence of a 
separable telecommunications component in the ISP’s 
operations as well as the relative importance of its role as a 
mere conduit.101  
Simply recognizing the telecommunications component 
of information services as a factual matter does not alone 
answer the question whether the FCC may actually regulate it. 
In fact, a review of the language of the Telecommunications Act 
appears to reveal a legislative intent to the contrary. In adopting 
the definitions for information and telecommunications service in 
  
 99 The Fourth Circuit recognized that this results in a pure transmission of 
data over the last mile (that is, the phone or cable connection between a household and 
the ISP). When the ISP transmits data over the last mile, “it is a pipeline for 
telecommunications and properly classified as a telecommunications facility because it 
transmits ‘information of the user’s choosing, without change in the form or content.’” 
Christian R. Eriksen, Cable Broadband: Did the Ninth Circuit Beat the FCC to the 
Punch in Last Mile Regulation?, 6 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 283, 287 (2004) 
(citing MediaOne Grp., Inc. v. Cnty. of Henrico, 257 F.3d 356, 364-65 (4th Cir. 2001)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit came to the same 
conclusion in AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 100 See Duncan Geere, How Deep Packet Inspection Works, WIRED.CO.UK (Apr. 27, 
2012), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2012-04/27/how-deep-packet-inspection-works. 
 101 See Lee L. Selwyn & Helen E. Golding, Revisiting the Regulatory Status of 
Broadband Internet Access: A Policy Framework for Net Neutrality and an Open 
Competitive Internet, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 91, 108 (2010) (“ISPs today . . . act primarily, 
if not exclusively, as conduits, forwarding and transmitting their subscribers’ data to or 
from one or more Internet gateways or ‘peering points’ from which the data is routed to 
or from a website or other Internet location designated by the end user. Even if the ISP 
also offers its own proprietary ‘information services,’ it typically uses the public 
Internet for providing access to such proprietary content or applications.”). For 
example, many more people use web-based email services rather than email services 
offered by ISPs. Additionally, ISPs have outsourced storage and caching functions to 
third parties called content delivery networks. See Athena Vakali & George Pallis, 
Content Delivery Networks: Status and Trends, IEEE INTERNET COMPUTING, Nov.–Dec. 
2003, at 68 (“ISPs use proxies to store the most frequently or most recently requested 
content.”). Similarly, many ISPs use third-party DNS servers. See “Allex”, Predictions 
for DNS in 2010, CENTERNETWORKS (Dec. 3, 2009), http://www.centernetworks.com/ 
predictions-for-google-dns-2010. 
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1996,102 Congress appears to have indicated its preference for 
treating information and telecommunications service as mutually 
exclusive categories. Information service means “the offering of 
[data processing capability] via telecommunications.”103 If 
information services could exist in both categories, the 
statutory definition of information services “would become 
tautological” because “such a service must simultaneously be a 
‘telecommunications service’ and perform its function ‘via 
telecommunications.’”104 Supreme Court precedent in Brand X, 
however, forecloses this argument completely. By applying 
Chevron deference to the FCC’s interpretation of “offering”—
necessary to the agency’s determination that broadband 
qualified only as an information service—the Supreme Court 
conclusively determined that ambiguity existed in the statute, 
and that ambiguity amounted to a Congressional delegation of 
authority to interpret the particular provision.105 Thus, by 
applying Chevron deference in Brand X, the Supreme Court 
implicitly left the definitions open to re-interpretation under 
State Farm.106  
D. Technological Convergence 
Even if the FCC were to decide against reversing its 
2002 Declaratory Ruling, the agency could achieve the same 
effect by abandoning its categorical exemption approach 
adopted in Computer II. Broadband would thus remain an 
information service, but the FCC would abandon the use of the 
telecommunications and information service definitions as the 
exclusive means of determining which technologies it would 
regulate or exempt. The FCC would find further State Farm 
support by identifying the anomalies created by technological 
convergence. Technological convergence, or the “moving 
  
 102 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967, 967 (2005) (recognizing the Telecommunications Act as updating definitional 
provisions of the Communications Act). 
 103 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 104 Peter W. Huber et al., Information Services, § 12.2.3, Federal 
Telecommunications Law (2011 Supp.). 
 105 “If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an 
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the 
statute by regulation.” Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 843-44 (1984). 
 106 See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 981 (discussing the interplay between Chevron 
and State Farm). 
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towards the use of one medium as opposed to many,”107 renders 
the FCC’s categorical exemptions functionally indistinct as 
advances in technology permit enjoyment of traditionally-
regulated communications technologies, such as cable television 
and phone services, on information service platforms.108 
Demonstrating this would satisfy Justice Kennedy’s heightened 
scrutiny in Fox I requiring an agency to explain the reasons why 
it has reversed that prior policy. Submitting proof of 
technological convergence would also be consistent with 
Kennedy’s suggestion that an agency could satisfy its burden 
by pointing to advances in technology. In abandoning the 
categorical exemption approach, the FCC should instead adopt 
a context-based approach akin to its policy adopted in Fox, 
when it decided to regulate the actual harm caused by use of 
indecent language. In particular, the FCC should adopt a 
standard for determining the regulability of communications 
technologies under Title II that considers whether any particular 
technology or entity serves the same or equivalent function as 
those technologies traditionally regulated under Title II. 
Convergence in communications technology becomes 
increasingly important because users today receive—on the 
same device and over broadband connections—various types of 
video content, music, radio, and telephony services.109 The 
Communications Act110 applies separate sets of regulations and 
obligations to different types of communications technologies, 
including Title II regulations applied to phone service, Title III to 
broadcasting, and Title VI for cable television.111 Technological 
convergence presents a unique problem, however, because digital 
services received over broadband contain elements of all three.112  
Voice-over-Internet Protocol (VoIP), or Internet-based 
phone service, illustrates why the FCC must recognize these 
technological advances when adopting a new approach. The 
  
 107 Thomas B. Fowler, Convergence in the Information Technology and 
Telecommunications World: Separating Reality From Hype, TELECOMMS. REV. 11, 11 (2002). 
 108 Id. at 17-18. 
 109 Id. at 12. 
 110 As amended by the Telecommunications Act. 
 111 “Much of the Communications Act is sector-specific, including Title II for 
telephone service, Title III for broadcasting, and Title VI for cable television. 
Depending on the classification of a company or service, different obligations may 
apply.” Kevin Werbach, The Network Utility, 60 DUKE L.J. 1761, 1771-72 (2011). 
Although the Telecommunications Act of 1996 adopted the “information services” 
category and meant to encompass Internet service, Congress’s silence as to how the 
FCC should regulate “information services” resulted in the uncertainty about the 
regulability of broadband today. Id. at 1774. 
 112 Id. at 1773-74.  
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FCC has not conclusively stated which title of the 
Communications Act governs VoIP, but the agency has 
nonetheless applied certain Title II regulations to it based on 
what the technology actually does.113 “Because VoIP constitutes 
the functional equivalent of Title II telephone service . . . the 
Commission can impose regulatory safeguards that . . . protect 
consumers but also have a direct and negative monetary 
impact on VoIP providers.”114 The FCC also articulated a similar 
functionalist rationale for abandoning the literal/nonliteral 
dichotomy in Fox I, a justification that satisfied Justice 
Kennedy’s heightened standard of review. By focusing on the 
real harm resulting from any use of offensive language, the FCC 
adopted a more flexible approach capable of regulating all 
occurrences of the prohibited activity. The FCC should similarly 
adopt a functional approach with respect to every technology 
potentially regulable under the Communications Act.  
Moreover, as technologies have converged, the FCC has 
faced increasing difficulties in determining under what 
category of regulation any new technology should fall.115 This 
difficulty mirrors the problems that the FCC encountered in 
Fox in identifying whether offensive language qualified as literal 
or nonliteral.116 Other technologies additionally demonstrate the 
FCC’s continuing conundrum. Skype, one of the most popular 
VoIP services, offers phones that look like any other landline 
phone for use in households.117 Similarly, Internet Protocol 
Television (IPTV) offerings, like AT&T’s U-verse and other video 
on demand (VOD) services, deliver “both data service and video 
programming in the electronic language known as Internet 
Protocol” rather than the traditional cable television offering 
over coaxial cable.118 Users receive IPTV directly through a set-
top box on a normal television, viewable without any difference 
  
 113 Rob Frieden, Legislative and Regulatory Strategies for Providing Consumer 
Safeguards in A Convergent Information and Communications Marketplace, 33 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 207, 224 n.60 (2011) (discussing six separate FCC 
decisions applying Title II regulations to VoIP). 
 114 Id. at 225. 
 115 See id. at 214-15. 
 116 See Broadcast Television Complaints Order, supra note 61, at 13308. 
 117 Skype: Phones, SKYPE.COM, http://shop.skype.com/phones/ (last visited Jan. 
16, 2012). Skype is just one of many VoIP services available to consumers today. See 
Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, Skype Jumps The Shark: Seven Alternative VoIP Services, 
ZDNET.COM (June 13, 2012), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/networking/skype-jumps-the-
shark-seven-alternative-voip-services/2488.  
 118 In-Sung Yoo, The Regulatory Classification of Internet Protocol Television: 
How the Federal Communications Commission Should Abstain from Cable Service Regulation 
and Promote Broadband Deployment, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 199, 201 (2009). 
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in format or presentation,119 although its classification as an 
information service places it outside of the FCC’s ability to 
regulate.120 Likewise, video-streaming services Hulu and Netflix 
deliver new and old movies and television shows to users 
through traditional living room televisions.121 
In addition, the historical policy reasons underpinning 
the FCC’s decision to adopt a categorical exemption approach 
have also changed. Computer II (and its predecessor Computer 
I)122 justified adoption of the categorical approach out of concern 
that AT&T, which had operated as a monopolist phone 
company prior to that time, would enter the enhanced data-
processing services industry and trample the competition.123 
The FCC also wanted to protect the emerging computing 
industry from burdensome common carriage regulations.124 The 
categorical exemption approach adopted in light of these policy 
reasons continues today despite the fact that these concerns no 
longer exist. First of all, AT&T now exists as one of the largest 
broadband providers.125 Additionally, industry consolidation—in 
which a smaller number of companies offer a greater number of 
services—reduces the need to protect companies that offer only 
Internet service from common carrier regulations when most 
ISPs today already comply with Communications Act regulation 
in their capacity as phone and cable companies.126  
For all of these reasons, the FCC would encounter little 
difficulty in justifying its decision to abandon the categorical 
exemption approach adopted in Computer II in light of 
technological advances and the fact that the policy considerations 
underpinning the original rules no longer exist.  
  
 119 Id. at 204.  
 120 See supra Part II.A.  
 121 See NETFLIX.COM, https://signup.netflix.com/MediaCenter/HowNetflixWorks 
(last visited Jan. 16, 2012); Hulu Plus: Devices, HULU.COM, http://www.hulu.com/plus/ 
devices?src=topnav (last visited Jan. 16, 2012); How Netflix Works. 
 122 In re Regulatory & Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of 
Computer & Commc’n Servs. & Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971) [hereinafter 
Computer I]. 
 123 Richard S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward: Formulating A New 
Communications Public Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers Model, 56 
FED. COMM. L.J. 587, 598 (2004).  
 124 Id. 
 125 AT&T Drives Most Internet Traffic for U.S. Businesses in September 2011, 
COMSCORE (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Press_Releases/2011/11/ 
AT_T_Drives_Most_Internet_Traffic_for_U.S._Businesses_in_September_2011. 
 126 Frieden, supra note 113, at 214. 
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IV. COMMON CARRIERS UNDER THE COMMON LAW 
Broadband providers qualify as common carriers under 
the common law, consistent with the definitions adopted by the 
Communications Act, because of how they hold themselves out 
to potential customers and how they treat content sent to and 
from their subscribers. The FCC risks undermining the policies 
of the Communications Act by failing to treat broadband 
providers as common carriers even when they qualify as such 
under traditional and modern tests. Applying these principles 
to find that broadband providers qualify as common carriers 
under Title II provides greater support for satisfying the State 
Farm and Fox standard of review.  
A. Principles  
Over half a century before the Communications Act was 
enacted, the Supreme Court eloquently declared that a 
common carrier “stand[s] . . . in the very ‘gateway of 
commerce.’”127 In 1934, Congress passed the Communications 
Act and imposed mandatory Title II regulations upon “common 
carriers,” defined by the statute as “any person engaged as a 
common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication 
by wire or radio . . . .”128 In adopting these definitions, the FCC 
defined a common carrier as “[a]ny person engaged in rendering 
communication service for hire to the public.”129 Because neither 
definition provides much guidance, resort to the common law 
and the understanding of common carriers at the time of 
enactment will assist in determining whether broadband 
providers would qualify under the statutory definition.130  
Common carrier duties derive from common law 
requirements imposed upon transportation businesses, such as 
ports or railroads, “to serve all comers and serve them equally.”131 
Eventually common carrier status extended to communications 
networks.132 In 1887, one month before Congress approved the 
  
 127 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 132 (1876). 
 128 47 U.S.C. § 153(11) (2006) (defining “common carrier”); 47 U.S.C. § 201 
(announcing general Title II obligations applied to common carriers). 
 129 47 C.F.R. § 101.3 (2012). 
 130 Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 640 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976). 
 131 Susan P. Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. REV. 871, 
878 (2009). 
 132 Id. 
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Interstate Commerce Act,133 the court in Chesapeake & Pacific 
Telephone Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Telephone Co. expressed the 
view of common carriers existing at the time: “The telegraph and 
telephone are important instruments of commerce, and their 
service, as such, has become indispensable to the commercial 
and business public.”134 These technologies, serving as “public 
vehicles of intelligence . . . have no power to discriminate, and, 
while offering ready to serve some, refuse to serve others.”135 
Although common carrier status regularly applied to 
natural monopolies,136 early common law cases reflected the 
view that even a private carrier that holds itself out to the 
public at large creates a common carrier duty by taking on a 
“quasi-public character.”137 An undertaking “to carry for all 
people indifferently” serves as the essential element of “quasi-
public character.”138 Yet the common law did not impose a 
requirement on carriers to literally make the service available 
to the entire public as a practical matter; common carrier 
status applied even to businesses that were sufficiently 
specialized that only a fraction of the population could make 
use of them.139  
B. A Case for Common Carriage 
Broadband providers arguably qualify as common 
carriers under modern and traditional common carrier tests. 
The current test used by courts to determine whether a carrier 
qualifies as a common carrier under the Communications Act 
asks: “(1) whether the carrier holds himself out to serve 
indifferently all potential users; and (2) whether the carrier 
allows customers to transmit intelligence of their own design and 
choosing.”140 The thrust of the second prong addresses whether the 
carrier actively regulates transmission of information based on 
  
 133 Transcript of Interstate Commerce Act, OURDOCUMENTS.GOV, 
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=49&page=transcript (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2013). 
 134 Chesapeake & P. Tel. Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Tel. Co., 7 A. 809, 811 (Md. 1887). 
 135 Id.  
 136 A natural monopoly exists “[i]f the entire demand within a relevant market 
can be satisfied at lowest cost by one firm rather than by two or more . . . .” Richard A. 
Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 548 (1969). 
 137 Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 640 
(D.C. Cir. 1976). 
 138 Id. at 641. 
 139 Id. 
 140 See, e.g., Iowa Telecomms. Servs., Inc. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 563 F.3d 743, 746 
(8th Cir. 2009). 
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the substantive content of the customer’s communications.141 This 
test does not depart substantially from the tests applied by courts 
and government agencies when Congress enacted the 
Communications Act.142 A determination that broadband service 
providers qualify as common carriers would subject them to 
mandatory regulation under Title II unless the FCC were to 
forbear from doing so in the public interest.143  
For purposes of determining whether broadband 
providers satisfy the common carrier test, the first prong asks 
whether broadband providers hold themselves out to serve all 
potential users indifferently. Broadband providers do not 
supply Internet service only to certain types of users for the 
broadband services.144 With respect to potential customers, all 
individuals freely transact with broadband providers for 
Internet access, and no broadband providers apply individual 
selection criteria in deciding whether or not to sell its services 
to a particular customer.145 As such, broadband providers satisfy 
the first prong of the common carrier test.  
As to the second prong, when a broadband user requests 
information from the Internet, that user initiates a process by 
which a host computer transmits information to the ISP,146 and 
the ISP then sends the data out to other networks before 
connecting to larger backbone networks until the packet 
arrives at the intended downstream destination.147 Each 
network in the middle of the system does little more than look 
at the destination address for the purpose of determining 
  
 141 U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 295 F.3d 1326, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 142 Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 640-43 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976). 
 143 47 U.S.C. § 160 (2006) (“[T]he Commission shall forbear from applying any 
regulation or any provision of this chapter to a telecommunications carrier or 
telecommunications service . . . if the Commission determines that . . . forbearance 
from applying such provision or regulation is consistent with the public interest.”). 
 144 See, e.g., Verizon’s Commitment to Our Broadband Internet Access Customers, 
VERIZON, http://www22.verizon.com/about/legacypages/broadbandcommitment.htm (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2013). Verizon explicitly states: “If you buy broadband Internet access 
from Verizon Online. We will not prevent you or other users of our service from sending 
and receiving the lawful content of your choice; running lawful applications and using 
lawful services of your choice; or connecting your choice of legal devices that do not 
harm the network or the provision of Internet access service, facilitate theft of service, 
or harm other users of the service. We will not unduly discriminate against any lawful 
Internet content, application, or service in a manner that causes meaningful harm to 
competition or to you or other users of our service.” Id. 
 145 See, e.g., id. 
 146 See Solum & Chung, supra note 27, at 842; see also Jeff Tyson, How 
Internet Infrastructure Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://computer.howstuffworks.com/ 
internet/basics/internet-infrastructure2.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2012). 
 147 See Solum & Chung, supra note 27, at 842; see also Tyson, supra note 146.  
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which network to forward the packet along to next.148 ISPs do 
not typically alter the contents of the data sent by users or 
block the transmission based on the contents of the data packet, 
provided that the transmission or the content is not unlawful.149 
In sum, because broadband providers hold themselves out to 
serve potential users indiscriminately and allow customers to 
transmit data of their own choosing, they therefore qualify for 
mandatory Title II regulation as common carriers. 
C. Net Neutrality Is a Light-Touch Approach Consistent 
with § 230 
Once the FCC has articulated a reasoned analysis for 
reversing its Declaratory Ruling and Computer II rulings, 
sufficient to survive State Farm review, the agency would enjoy 
the flexibility to erect a long-term, sustainable regulatory 
regime over broadband Internet. Simply because Title II 
applies to broadband or to information services as a general 
matter does not necessarily require application of the full scope 
of common carrier regulation. Under § 160, Congress gave the 
FCC authority to forbear regulating any entity under Title II if 
justified in the public interest.150 In fact, permitting the FCC to 
regulate under the § 160 forbearance provision would permit 
the FCC to apply the exact same level of regulation on the 
industry as it currently applies under the categorical exemption 
approach. The FCC explicitly recognized this in its Common 
Carrier Notice Inquiry.151 A substantial benefit would accrue, 
however, in that the forbearance provisions would permit the 
FCC to remain flexible and attentive to new harms and 
changing market conditions. Regardless of the potential 
benefits of flexibility, the FCC must nonetheless demonstrate 
that regulation of some or any of the broadband industry does 
not conflict with the policy statements of the statute.  
  
 148 See SALTZER ET AL., supra note 25, at 2-3. Under some circumstances, ISPs 
may inspect data packets and block illegal content (e.g., illegal downloading, malware, 
etc.), but otherwise broadband providers do not individually select the content they 
transmit to and from their subscribers based on the data packet’s substantive content. 
See, e.g., Verizon’s Commitment to Our Broadband Internet Access Customers, supra 
note 144; Dennis O’Reilly, How To Use VPN To Defeat Deep Packet Inspection, CNET 
(Feb. 12, 2012), http://howto.cnet.com/8301-11310_39-57381346-285/how-to-use-vpn-to-
defeat-deep-packet-inspection/. These activities should not defeat common carrier 
status, just as any other common carrier might actively regulate activities that are 
harmful to other customers or that otherwise result in a violation of law.  
 149 O’Reilly, supra note 148. 
 150 47 U.S.C. § 160 (2006). 
 151 Competitive Carrier Notice, supra note 68, at 464. 
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Although the policy statements provided in § 230 clearly 
express Congressional intent for the Internet to exist in an 
environment of deregulation, those statements do not compel 
the conclusion that Congress desired a complete absence of 
regulation.152 Section 230(b)(2) calls upon the FCC “to preserve 
the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists 
for the Internet and other interactive computer services, 
unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”153 In the Declaratory 
Ruling, the FCC concluded that the policy statements under 
§ 230 applied to technologies captured by its “information 
services” definition in § 153(24).154 As a result, the FCC 
determined that “information services” should exist in an 
environment of “regulatory forbearance” marked by the 
removal of regulatory barriers.155 The FCC, however, may have 
read those policy statements too broadly when it concluded 
that no regulation of information services should ever be 
warranted.156 In fact, the policy statements in § 230 stand for 
nothing more than the proposition that Congress intended for 
“information services” to exist in an environment of reduced 
regulation. “Reduced regulation” does not necessitate an 
environment of zero regulation.  
That conclusion becomes apparent in light of the 
heightened regulatory environment for common carriers. 
Section 201 of Title II announces the general mandatory 
common carrier obligation that “[i]t shall be the duty of every 
common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign communication 
by wire or radio to furnish such communication service upon 
reasonable request therefor.”157 In regulating carriers, the FCC 
may require a common carrier to allow competitors to access its 
lines and charge consumers reasonable rates.158 The Act prohibits 
common carriers from making “unjust or unreasonable 
  
 152 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
 153 In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet over Cable & 
Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C. Rcd. 4798, 4801-02 (2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem 
Ruling] (citing § 230(b)(2)). 
 154 In the Cable Modem Ruling, the FCC concluded that “consistent with 
section 230(b)(2) of the Act, we seek ‘to preserve the vibrant and competitive free 
market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, 
unfettered by Federal or State regulation.’” Id. Further they “conclude[d] that cable 
modem service, as it is currently offered, is properly classified as an interstate 
information service.”). Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2006). 
 158 Id. 
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charges.”159 For purposes of disclosure and review, common 
carriers must file with the FCC a schedule of charges and 
provide notice of any changes to them,160 subject to discretionary 
hearings conducted by the FCC for determining the lawfulness 
of the rate revisions.161 The Act additionally requires 
telecommunications carriers, among other things, to 
“interconnect” with other carriers,162 to offer “unbundled” 
services,163 and to contribute to a universal service fund.164  
The FCC could nonetheless remain faithful to § 230 
policy statements by adopting a “light-touch” common carrier 
approach in implementing network neutrality regulations.165 In 
doing so, the FCC could avoid applying all existing common 
carrier rules to broadband providers based on its authority to 
forbear regulation in the public interest under § 160. Many 
months before the FCC released the Open Internet Order in 2010, 
the agency had explored the possibility of applying network 
neutrality rules by regulating only the telecommunications 
component of information services under Title II. In doing so, the 
FCC would apply, among others, §§ 201, 202, and 208 to prevent 
“unreasonable denials of service” and other “unjust or 
unreasonable practices.”166 While an approach to separate out 
the components of information services might bear some 
promise, a State Farm approach stands on firmer ground. 
Nevertheless, the proposal to adopt only §§ 201, 202, and 208 
would operate effectively as a light-touch common carrier 
approach to implementing network neutrality regulation on 
broadband providers.  
CONCLUSION 
The FCC’s continuing jurisdictional difficulties 
demonstrate the need for a different approach. By abandoning 
FCC policies established in Computer II and the Declaratory 
  
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. § 203. 
 161 Id. § 204(a)(1).  
 162 Id. § 251. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. § 254. The universal service provision requires that common carriers 
contribute to a fund that subsidizes basic telephony services for underserved and 
under-funded populations. Crawford, supra note 131, at 899. 
 165 Austin Schlick, A Third-Way Legal Framework For Addressing The 
Comcast Dilemma, BROADBAND.GOV (May 6, 2010), http://www.broadband.gov/third-
way-legal-framework-for-addressing-the-comcast-dilemma.html.  
 166 Id.  
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Ruling, the agency can establish a long-term, sustainable 
regime to regulate broadband providers. To justify the reversal 
of its policies, the FCC should point to the technical and 
functional anomalies created through the use of inflexible 
categorical exemptions as a way to regulate a dynamic and 
constantly evolving industry. Moreover, evidence that broadband 
providers qualify as common carriers under common law tests 
add further weight to the importance of bringing FCC authority 
in line with the exercise of power granted to it by Congress in 
1934 and 1996.  
Once the FCC has adequately satisfied the State Farm 
and Fox standards for reversal of its policies, the agency would 
enjoy full discretion to regulate broadband providers under 
Title II. The deregulatory pronouncements, however, contained 
in § 230 of the Act caution against application of regulations 
that impose regulatory barriers or impact the vibrant and 
competitive broadband market. Nevertheless, application of 
network neutrality principles would remain fully consistent 
with those policies articulated in the statute. They would 
provide a workable framework for protecting against the 
economic harms caused to both consumers and makers of 
online content by ISP practices of discriminating against and 
interfering with certain types of online content. These harms 
necessitate some FCC involvement to foster the innovative 
dynamic aptly described in the Schumpeterian growth theory, 
which accommodates the existence of large incumbent firms 
but requires an interdependent relationship with the insurgent 
entrepreneurs to spur economic growth through product 
innovation. Indeed, it is competition that strikes at the very 
foundation and lives of the world’s innovators, but without a 
neutral platform of competition—the broadband connection 
itself—that dynamic cannot survive. 
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